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1. Introduction 
Two interrelated and critical issues facing the U.S. and world economies are the dwindling supply 
of fossil fuels and the increasing emissions of carbon into the atmosphere. The U.S. dependence 
on imported oil, in particular, has increased sharply in the past quarter century, with a number of 
significant economic and political consequences. Oil imports worsen the U.S. balance of trade 
deficit and, together with growing energy consumption from developing countries such as China, 
lead to higher prices. Some argue that this dependence on oil imports weakens U.S. national 
security and entails significant military and defense expenditures to ensure continued U.S. access 
to world oil supplies. Separately, there is the concern with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
associated with fossil energy use. While some disagreement exists on the potential implications 
of carbon buildup in the atmosphere, it seems that the major industrialized countries are moving 
toward a regime in which these emissions will be regulated and (or) priced.  
Partly in response to such issues, government support for biofuels has led to rapid 
growth in U.S. ethanol production. U.S. fuel ethanol production has increased from 1.65 billion 
gallons in 2000 to 10.76 billion gallons in 2009, making the U.S. the largest world producer of 
ethanol. This dramatic expansion of ethanol production owes much to critical support policies 
implemented by the United States. Specifically, U.S. ethanol production currently benefits from a 
$0.45/gallon subsidy (technically an excise tax credit), an out-of-quota ad valorem import tariff 
of 2.5% and a $0.54/gallon duty on ethanol imports. In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
specified a renewable fuel standard that “mandates” specific targets for renewable fuel use, the 
level of which has been considerably expanded by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Since then, the ethanol mandates under the 
RFS2 have been more than met, with ethanol production of 10.76 billion gallons in 2009 
exceeding the mandate level by 0.26 billion gallons.1
Given these ambitious targets and government policy geared to implement them, it is 
important to have a clear understanding of the welfare implications of policies that impact 
biofuels production. This topic has been the subject of a few studies that have elucidated some 
critical economic effects. De Gorter and Just (2009a) analyze the impact of a biofuel blend 
  According to the RFS2, the renewable fuel 
requirement rises from 12.95 billion gallons in 2010 to 20.5 billion gallons in 2015, and to 36 
billion gallons in 2022; of these latter amounts, up to 15 billion gallons may come from ethanol, 
while the rest are meant to come from “advanced biofuels,” such as cellulosic biofuel.  
                                                 
1 The ethanol production of 4.84 billion gallons in 2006 and 6.48 billion gallons in 2007 exceeded 
the previous RFS mandates of 4.0 billion gallons in 2006 and 4.7 billion gallons in 2007. Ethanol 
production of 9.23 billion gallons in 2008 also slightly surpassed the RFS2 mandate of 9.0 billion 
gallons.  
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mandate on the fuel market. They find that when tax credits are implemented along with the 
blend mandate, tax credits subsidize fuel consumption instead of biofuels. De Gorter and Just 
(2009b) also develop a framework to analyze the interaction effects of a biofuel tax credit and a 
price-contingent farm subsidy. The annual rectangular deadweight costs—which arise because 
they conclude that ethanol would not be commercially viable without government 
intervention—dwarf in value the traditional triangular deadweights costs of farm subsidies.  
Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) set up a multimarket international ethanol model to analyze 
the influence of trade liberalization and the removal of the federal tax credit in the U.S. on 
ethanol markets. They find that the removal of current tariffs on imported ethanol will lead to a 
13.6% decrease in the U.S. domestic ethanol price and a 3.7% increase of ethanol’s share in U.S. 
fuel consumption. With the removal of both tax credits ($0.54/gallon at the time of that study) 
and tariffs, their study predicts that U.S. ethanol consumption will fall by 2.1% and the price of 
ethanol will fall by 18.4%.  
The foregoing studies do not account explicitly for the impact of climate policies on 
GHG emissions associated with the fuel energy sector. Khanna, Ando and Taheripour (2008) 
examine the welfare impact of a carbon tax ($25/tC) on fuel consumption, when the purpose of 
the tax is to correct the pollution externality from carbon emissions and to account for the other 
external costs associated with congestions and accidents. At the time of their study, they found 
that the fuel tax of $0.387/gallon and then-current ethanol subsidy of $0.51/gallon reduces 
carbon emissions by 5% relative to the no-tax situation (lassez faire).2
In considering the effectiveness of ethanol in reducing GHG emissions, one issue that 
arises is that of “indirect land use” effects. It is argued that diverting feed corn to ethanol 
production in the United States might bring new marginal land into production elsewhere in 
order to satisfy the increased demand for agricultural output (Searchinger et al. 2008), an indirect 
effect of biofuel mandates that could be quite sizable. To assess the global economic and land-
use impacts of biofuel mandates, Hertel, Tyner and Birur (2008) use a computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE), which is built upon the standard Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) modeling framework. To jointly meet the biofuel mandate policies of the United States 
(15 billion gallons of ethanol used by 2015) and the EU (6.25% of total fuel as renewable fuel by 
  Their second best policy of 
a $0.085 mile tax with a $1.70/gallon ethanol subsidy could reduce gasoline consumption by 
16.8%, thereby reducing carbon emissions by 16.5% (71.7 million metric tons).  
                                                 
2 Some studies discuss emissions in terms of metric tons of carbon (tC), other in terms of metric 
tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2). One metric ton of carbon is equivalent to 3.67 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide (conversely, one metric ton of carbon dioxide is equivalent to 0.27 metric tons of 
carbon). Of course, when reductions are expressed in percentages, units will not matter.  
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2015), they find that coarse grains acreage in the United States rises by 10%, oilseeds acreage in 
the EU increases dramatically, by 40%, cropland areas in the United States would increase by 
0.8%, and about one-third of these changes occur because of the EU mandate policy. The U.S. 
and EU mandate policies jointly reduce the forest and pasture land areas of the United States by 
3.1% and 4.9%, respectively. 
However, the most recent RFS2 pronouncement by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has accounted for international indirect land use changes (ILUC) and made 
several changes for GHG emissions reduction of ethanol from all feedstocks (EPA 2010). 
Accounting for ILUC, the EPA finds that corn ethanol still achieves a 21% GHG reduction 
compared to gasoline. On the other hand, sugarcane ethanol qualifies as an advanced biofuel 
according to the overall result of the EPA’s ILUC modification given that its calculated average 
of 61% GHG reduction compared to baseline gasoline exceeds the 50% GHG reduction 
threshold for advanced biofuels. Sugarcane ethanol even meets the 60% GHG reduction 
standard for cellulosic ethanol. 
Lapan and Moschini (2009) note that most of the existing work does not explicitly 
account for the welfare consequences to the U.S. of policies supporting biofuel production (such 
as the externality of GHG emission or the benefits to the U.S. that accrue either from improved 
terms of trade or “improved national security” due to decreased reliance on oil imports). To 
consider first- and second-best policies within that normative context, Lapan and Moschini 
(2009) build a simplified general equilibrium (multi-market) model of the United States and the 
rest-of-the-world economies that links the agricultural and energy sectors to each other and to 
the world markets. That paper models the process by which corn is converted into ethanol, 
accounts for byproducts of this process, and allows for the endogeneity of world oil and corn 
prices, as well as the (different) carbon emissions from gasoline derived from oil and that which 
is blended with ethanol. The analysis presented is theoretical in nature, aiming at providing 
analytical insights and results. The authors find that, in their setting, the first best policy would 
include a tax on carbon emissions, an import tax on oil, and an export tax on corn. If policy is 
constrained, for example by international obligations, they find that a fuel tax and an ethanol 
subsidy can be welfare enhancing. They also find that an ethanol mandate is likely to welfare-
dominate an ethanol subsidy. 
In this paper we construct a tractable computational model that applies and extends the 
analytical setup of Lapan and Moschini (2009), and we use the model to provide quantitative 
estimates of the welfare benefits of alternative policies. The model specification allows 
endogenous determination of equilibrium quantities and prices for oil, corn and ethanol and is 
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calibrated to represent a recent benchmark data set for the year 2009, using the available 
econometric evidence on elasticity estimates. By varying government policy, we explore how 
these policies affect equilibrium (domestic and world) prices of corn, oil, ethanol and gasoline. 
Using standard welfare measures, we compare the net welfare implications of alternative policies 
and show how different groups are affected by the policies. In addition to characterizing the first 
best policy, we consider a number of second best interventions involving various combinations 
of ethanol mandates, ethanol subsidies and a fuel tax. Using the model, we calculate the optimal 
values for the policy instruments (given the constraint on which instruments are used) and the 
associated welfare gains. We then explore the robustness of our conclusions by varying the 
values of various parameters.  
Our results consistently show that the largest economic gains to the U.S. from policy 
intervention come from the impact of policies on the U.S. terms of trade, particularly on the 
price of oil imports. We also find that first best policy outcomes, which would require oil import 
tariffs that are not consistent with U.S. international obligations, can be closely approximated by 
second best tools such as fuel taxes. Furthermore, our results probably underestimate the gains 
that come from reducing U.S. oil imports because the model does not account for any of the 
“national security” gains that could arise from reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil.  
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review and extend the analytical 
model by Lapan and Moschini (2009). Next, we present the equilibrium conditions of the model 
so that, in conjunction with the assumed parameter values, which are also reported, our results 
can be readily replicated. This is followed by a definition of our welfare measure and a discussion 
of how (constrained) optimal policy can be determined. Finally, we report and discuss the results 
of our simulations, comparing the relative efficacy of alternative policies and investigating the 
sensitivity of these results to parametric values.  
 
2. The Model 
We adapt and extend the model developed in Lapan and Moschini (2009) to make it more 
suitable for simulating the consequences of alternative policies directed toward reducing U.S. 
emissions and reducing U.S. reliance on oil imports. The main extension is to recognize that 
when oil is refined, other products, in addition to gasoline, are produced (e.g., distillate fuel oil, 
jet fuel, etc.). We aggregate all the non-gasoline output into a single good called petroleum 
byproducts. The model is a stylized economy with three basic commodities: a numeraire good, 
corn (food) output and oil. In addition, there is a processing sector that refines oil into gasoline 
and other petroleum byproducts, and another sector that converts corn into ethanol, which may 
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then be blended with gasoline to create “fuel” used by households. Consumers are assumed to 
have quasi-linear preferences (which can then be aggregated into a representative consumer) with 
utility function 
 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )f c h g eU y D D D x xφ θ η σ λ= + + + − +  
 
where y  represents consumption of the numeraire, and ( , , )f c hD D D  represent consumption of 
fuel, of food, and of petroleum byproducts, respectively. The last term, ( )σ ⋅ , represents 
environmental damages from carbon emissions due to aggregate combustion of gasoline and 
ethanol. The parameter λ  reflects the relative pollution emissions of ethanol as compared to 
gasoline (we will return to this parameter later).  
The basic elements of the model consist of the following: 
 
(I)  U.S. demand for corn as food/feed, represented by ( )c cD p  
(II)  U.S. demand for fuel ( )f fD p  
(III) U.S. demand for petroleum byproducts ( )h hD p  
(IV)  U.S. corn supply equation ( )c cS p  
(V)  U.S. oil supply equation ( )o oS p  
(VI)  Foreign oil export supply curve ( )wo oS p   
(VII) Foreign corn import demand curve ( )wc cD p  
(VIII) U.S. oil refining sector, which converts oil into gasoline and petroleum byproducts 
(IX) U.S. ethanol production sector, which converts corn into ethanol, and produces a 
byproduct of dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS), which becomes part of the 
food/feed supply 
 
Components (I)-(VII) of the model are self-explanatory. In particular, the (household) demand 
curves (I-III) come from utility maximization, and thus are the inverse of the marginal utility 
relations ( )fDφ′ , ( )cDθ ′ , and ( )hDη′ , respectively, and , ,f c hp p p  are the prices facing 
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households.3
( ),c op p
  The domestic supply relations (IV and V) come from competitive profit 
maximization so that (assuming no externalities associated with their production) they are the 
inverse of the marginal private (and social) costs; because we assume no taxes on domestic corn 
or oil producers,  represent both supply and demand prices.4
( , )w wo cp p
 The foreign relations (VI 
and VII) represent aggregate excess world oil supply and world corn demand, and distinguishing 
the world prices  from domestic prices allows for the possibility of U.S. border policies 
(tariffs or quotas) that would cause U.S. prices to diverge from world prices. Note that if the 
United States were a small country, world prices ( , )w wo cp p  would be exogenous to U.S. economic 
conditions. However, in reality, the U.S. is a large economic agent in both markets and our 
simulation will reflect that fact. Finally, components (VIII) and (IX) of the model require a bit 
more elaboration.  
 
2.1. Oil Refining Sector 
The refinement of oil yields gasoline gx  and petroleum byproducts hx . We assume a fixed 
coefficients production technology so that the process is represented as follows:5
 
(2.1) 
 
,g o ox Min x zβ =       
(2.2) 2h gx xβ β=  
 
where gx  is gallons of gasoline output, hx  is gallons of the petroleum byproduct, ox  is barrels 
of oil input (where domestically produced oil and imported oil are perfect substitutes), and oz  is 
the amount of a composite input, which aggregates all other inputs used in the oil refining 
process. Thus, β  is the number of gallons of gasoline per barrel of crude oil, and 2β  is the 
                                                 
3 Since the marginal utility of the numeraire is one, the marginal rate of substitution between 
each one of the three consumption goods (food, fuel and petroleum byproducts) and the 
numeraire is the same as the marginal utility of that good. The price of the numeraire is (by 
definition) normalized to one, so , ,f c hp p p  represent relative prices. 
 
4 We do allow for taxes or subsidies on fuel and ethanol, which is equivalent to taxes or subsidies 
on gasoline and ethanol. 
 
5 Although in reality there is some substitutability among the various products produced from 
crude oil, it seems that this substitutability is limited and that the assumption of fixed 
proportions in output provides a reasonable approximation. 
7 
 
number of gallons of the petroleum byproduct per barrel of oil. This technology and perfect 
competition imply the following relationship among input and output prices: 
  
(3) 2g h o gp p pβ β βω+ = +  
 
where gω  represents the unit cost of the composite input oz , including the rental price of 
capacity. 
 
2.2. Ethanol Production Sector 
We also assume a fixed coefficients production process for ethanol production: 
 
(4) ,e c ex Min x zα =    
 
where ex  is ethanol output  and ez  the amount of other inputs used per unit of ethanol output. 
Because the energy content of ethanol is much lower than that of gasoline, and given our 
working assumption that consumers’ demand take that into account (e.g., they ultimately care 
about the miles traveled with any given amount of fuel, as discussed in de Gorter and Just 2010), 
it is important to keep track of this fact to handle the blending of ethanol and gasoline (into fuel) 
in a consistent fashion. Consequently, ex  in equation (4) and in what follows is measured in what 
we term “gasoline-energy-equivalent gallon” (GEEG) units.6
1δ
 Furthermore, we wish to account 
for the valuable bioproducts of ethanol production by counting only the “net” use of corn in the 
technological relation in (4). That is, if one bushel of corn used in ethanol production also yields 
 units of distillers dried grains with soluble (DDGS), which, being a close corn-substitute in 
feed use, we assume commands a price of 2 cpδ , then the net amount of corn required to 
produce a  gallons of ethanol is only ( )1 21 δ δ− . Hence, the production parameter α  in (4) 
satisfies 
 
(5) 
1 21
aγ
α
δ δ
=
−
 
                                                 
6 This measure is related to the more common notion of a “gasoline gallon equivalent,” which is 
defined as the amount of alternative fuel it takes to equal the energy content of one gallon of 
gasoline (essentially this represents the reciprocal of our measure). 
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where a  is the number of gallons of ethanol (in natural units) per bushel of corn; γ  captures the 
lower energy content of ethanol (relative to gasoline); 1δ represents the units of DDGS per 
bushel of corn used to produce ethanol; and 2δ represents the relative price of DDGS.  
Given perfect competition in the ethanol sector, this implies the following price relation 
between the supply price of ethanol and the price of corn: 
 
(6) ce e
p
p ω
α
= +  
 
where eω  is the cost of all inputs other than corn, including the rental cost of plant capacity, 
required to produce one unit of ethanol (measured in gasoline energy equivalent units) and ep  is 
the price of one GEEG of ethanol.   
 
3. Equilibrium  
In order to simulate the model, we need to specify the equilibrium conditions that must hold and 
the set of policy instruments that are considered. For the purpose of our policy analysis, the 
policy instruments that we allow are border policies, fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies/taxes (or 
border policies, ethanol mandates and ethanol subsidies).7 We assume there is trade in crude oil 
but no trade in the refined products, which is a fair approximation of the status quo.8
 
 Given all 
that, the equilibrium conditions are as follows: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )wc c c c c c eS p D p D p x α= + +   (Corn Market Equilibrium) 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }wf f o o o o eD p S p S p xβ= + +   (Fuel Market Equilibrium) 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 wh h o o o oD p S p S pβ= +   (Petroleum Byproduct Equilibrium) 
                                                 
7 If we also allowed, for example, a tax/subsidy on corn production, we would have to 
distinguish between the supply and demand prices for corn. 
 
8 Although imports account for over 50% of U.S. crude oil consumption, over the period 2007-
2009 net imports of gasoline averaged about 1.7% of  total consumption and net trade of  
“Refinery and Blender Finished Petroleum Product” averaged (in absolute value) under 3% of 
total consumption (calculated from the “Supply and Disposition Tables” of the U.S. Energy 
Information, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbbl_m_cur.htm).  
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(10) 2g h o gp p pβ β βω+ = +     (Zero Profit Condition Oil Refining) 
(11) ce e
p
p ω
α
= +      (Zero Profit Condition Ethanol Industry) 
(12) wo o op p τ= +      (Oil Import Arbitrage Relation) 
(13) wc c cp p τ= +      (Corn Export Arbitrage Relation) 
 
Note that equation (7) embeds the technological relationship α=c ex x . In equations (12) and 
(13), ( , )o cτ τ  are the oil-import-specific and corn-export-specific tariffs, respectively (assumed to 
be non-prohibitive, so trade still occurs). To close the model, consider first the hypothetical case 
of laissez faire equilibrium, in which 0o cτ τ= =  and there are no other active policy instruments 
that interfere with the competitive equilibrium. Then we must also have e g fp p p= = , and 
subject to this restriction, conditions (7)-(13) can be solved for the equilibrium prices 
( , , , , , )w wc c o o f hp p p p p p  and for the ethanol quantity ex . For scenarios in which there are active 
policy instruments, on the other hand, model closure needs to be tailored to the specifics of the 
policy that applies (e.g., the case of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies, or that of a binding ethanol 
“mandate”). 
 
3.1. Equilibrium with Fuel Taxes and Ethanol Subsidies 
Let t  be the consumption tax on fuel, per gallon, and b  be the volumetric blending subsidy per 
gallon of ethanol. Then, because gasoline and ethanol are modeled as perfect substitutes for 
consumers once measured in GEEG units, and because one gallon of ethanol is equivalent to γ  
GEEGs, arbitrage relations imply9
 
, 
(14) g fp p t= −  
(15A) e f g
b tp p p b
γ γ
= + − = + 
 
 
where ( )0 (1 )b b t γ γ≡ − −  is the effective net subsidy to ethanol, as compared to gasoline, per 
                                                 
9 The assumption of perfect substitutes seems valid up to at least a 10% utilization rate for 
ethanol. 
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GEEG unit. 10
{ }, , ,o c t bτ τ
 Thus, for the case of taxes and subsidies, equations (7)-(13), (14) and (15A) can be 
used to calculate the equilibrium, given the policy parameters . 
 
3.2. Equilibrium with Mandates 
With a binding ethanol mandate (denoted by Mex ) equations (7)-(13) still apply, but with 
M
e ex x=  exogenously set. Note that in this case the amount of corn utilized by the ethanol 
industry is fixed at Mex α , and so, as equation (7) makes clear, the corn price is effectively 
determined in the corn market. Furthermore, the prices of fuel, gasoline and ethanol will have to 
be such that arbitrage possibilities are exhausted, i.e., blenders that combine ethanol and gasoline 
earn zero profit. This zero profit condition, allowing for the existence of exogenous fuel taxes 
and ethanol subsidies, can be expressed as 
 
(15B)  ( ) ( ) − ⋅ = − + − ⋅  ( ) ( ) .M Mf f f g f f e e ep t D p p D p x p b x  
 
Equation (15B) states that the price of fuel is a weighted average of the price of its components 
(ethanol, gasoline), where the amount of ethanol is exogenously determined. Thus, with a 
mandate, the equilibrium is calculated using equations (7)-(13) and (15B). As shown in Lapan 
and Moschini (2009), the impact of an ethanol mandate is that of combining a fuel tax effect 
with an ethanol subsidy effect. 
 
4. Welfare 
In defining welfare, we assume all tax revenue is returned to domestic consumers and that there 
are no externalities other than those due to carbon emissions. Domestic welfare could be 
calculated using the indirect utility function along with the profit function for the domestic oil 
and corn industries and government tax revenue, or by using the direct utility function along 
with the production costs for domestic oil and corn, and the net imports from world trade in oil 
and corn. Using the latter approach, and consumer preferences in equation (1), we have 
 
                                                 
10 Note that (15A) also accounts for the fact that the tax on fuel t  is levied per volume unit. 
Because it takes 1 1γ >  gallons of ethanol to make one GEEG of fuel, the effective tax on 
ethanol is higher than that on gasoline.  
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(16)  
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
w w
c o e e g g o o c c
g e c h g e
W I C Q S x x p S p D
x x D D x x
ω ω
φ θ η σ λ
 = − −Ω − − − − 
 + + + + − +
 
 
 
The term in curly brackets in (16) measures consumption of the numeraire good, y , while the 
term in square brackets on the second line measures consumer utility derived from consumption 
of fuel, corn and petroleum byproducts, and the last term measures the disutility due to pollution 
arising from energy consumption. Consumption of the numeraire in (16) is total income I
 
(taken as exogenous and measured in numeraire units) less (i) ( )cC Q , the cost of aggregate corn 
output; (ii) ( )oSΩ , the cost of domestic oil production; (iii) { }e e g gx xω ω+ , the cost of the other 
inputs used in ethanol production and oil refining; and (iv) w wo o c cp S p D −  , the value of net 
imports of oil and corn, which are paid for with the numeraire good. Note that the competitive 
equilibrium conditions ( )c cC Q p′ =  and ( )o oS p′Ω =  yield the inverse supply curves, so 
specification of the supply curves for the two goods, used in equilibrium conditions (7) and (8), 
implies the form of the cost relations in (16). Similarly, specification of the demand relations 
used in (7)-(9) imply the forms of the sub-utility functions in (16), so the only additional 
specification of functional forms needed for the welfare calculations is that of the externality 
term, ( )..σ . Thus, for the simulation exercise, welfare comparisons for different policy tools 
( ), , , ; Mc o et b xτ τ  can be made by solving the equilibrium conditions from section (3), specifying 
( )σ ⋅  and then using (16) to calculate welfare.     
To understand how the optimal (or second best) policies are determined, take the total 
differential of (16) and rearrange terms to yield11
(17)  
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
θ φ λσ ω α φ β β η σ ω β ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − − − + + − − − Ω 
   ′ ′ ′ ′+ Ω − + + + −      
2
.
c e e g g
w w w w w w
o o o o o o c c c c c c
dW C dD C dx dx
p S dp dS S dp p D dp dD C D dp
 
 
The first three terms in (17) relate to domestic resource allocation decisions, whereas the last two 
relate to trade decisions, and for each term, optimality entails equating marginal benefit to 
marginal cost. Thus, θ ′  is the value to consumers of additional corn consumption, C′  is the 
                                                 
11 See Lapan and Moschini (2009) for full details. 
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marginal cost of corn production, and hence optimality requires { }Cθ ′ ′= . Similarly, the second 
term—relating to ethanol production—says that the marginal value of fuel to consumers, less the 
pollution cost, should be equated to the marginal cost of producing ethanol. A similar 
interpretation applies to the third term, where the term in square brackets is the net social value of 
another unit of refined gasoline and byproducts, and ( )gω β ′+ Ω   is the extraction and refining 
cost of producing that gallon. The two terms in the second row relate to trade decisions and are 
the only places where (world) prices appear explicitly; domestic prices affect domestic welfare 
only insofar as they affect resource allocation, but changes in world prices affect domestic 
welfare directly. Thus, the last two terms state that the marginal cost of producing oil 
domestically should equal the marginal cost of importing oil, and that the marginal cost of 
producing corn domestically should equal the marginal revenue derived from corn exports.  
In a market economy, rational consumers equate the marginal private value of a good to 
the market price they face, and competitive profit-maximizing firms will equate the marginal 
private cost to the prices they face. Hence, the rationale for government intervention arises when 
there is some divergence between private and social costs or benefits. In our model this 
divergence obviously occurs when fuel is consumed, because of the externality generated by the 
combustion of that fuel. Furthermore, from the perspective of the domestic economy, a 
divergence between private and (domestic) social costs also occurs if the country’s trade 
decisions affect world prices. For example, for a competitive firm importing oil, the marginal 
private cost of the import is its price wop , but from the perspective of the economy as a whole, if 
additional imports increase world price, the marginal cost of the import is higher than that, 
namely, ( )w wo o o op S dp dS+ . Similarly, for corn exports, the marginal value perceived by a 
competitive corn exporter is wcp , whereas the marginal revenue for the country as a whole is 
( )w wc c c cp D dp dD+ . Thus, as shown in Lapan and Moschini (2009), the first best policy entails 
oil import tariffs, corn export tariffs and a tax on carbon emissions. As for the latter, the “carbon 
tax” is fully equivalent, in this model, to a fuel tax (i.e., a tax on both gasoline and ethanol) along 
with an ethanol subsidy (because of the assumed differential pollution of ethanol, captured by 
the parameter λ ).12 Specifically, it is shown that the “first best” policy instruments are13
                                                 
12 The first best net ethanol subsidy, 
 
b , reflects the differential pollution rates between the two 
energy sources. The fact that the statutory fuel tax is in gallon terms implies a higher effective tax 
on ethanol in GEEG units. Thus, even if ethanol caused the same amount of pollution as 
gasoline, the first best would require a positive gross subsidy b  to ethanol to offset the higher 
fuel tax.  
13 
 
 
(18) 
( )
σ
λ σ
τ
τ
′= ⋅
′= − ⋅
′= ⋅ ⋅
′= ⋅ ⋅

*
*
*
*
( );
1 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).
o o o
c c c
t
b
S S
D D
 
 
In our analysis, such a first best scenario provides an important (and insightful) 
benchmark for other, perhaps more realistic, policy scenarios. Another useful benchmark is the 
“laissez faire” scenario, i.e., the unfettered competitive equilibrium with 0o ct b τ τ= = = = . In fact, 
all welfare calculations are reported as differences relative to the laissez faire, and comparisons of 
each policy scenario with the first best provide information as to the efficacy of the various 
second best policies considered. Note that in all scenarios except the first best we restrict tariffs 
to be zero (i.e., 0o cτ τ= = ) so that, realistically, they presume that the United States is in 
compliance with its WTO obligations.14 Once we impose this restriction, we are operating in a 
“second best” environment and the (constrained) optimal values of these second best 
instruments depend on the feasible policy space. As noted, we assume the feasible policy 
instruments are fuel taxes and/or ethanol subsidies (or ethanol mandates and/or ethanol 
subsidies or fuel taxes).15
 
 Using these policy restrictions and the behavioral conditions outlined 
earlier, (17) can be rewritten as 
(17A)  ( ) ( )λσ σ′ ′= − − + − − − + .f e e f g g o o c cdW p p dx p p dx S dp D dp  
 
Thus, when tariffs are not permitted, in determining the welfare consequences of domestic 
policy instruments, one must consider their impact on the terms of trade as well as on carbon 
emissions. As we shall see from the simulations, under many plausible scenarios, it is these “large 
country” effects that dominate the welfare calculations. When there are no border policies, it can 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 To calculate the actual values of the instruments, the equilibrium conditions described in 
Section 3 must be used in conjunction with (18).  
 
14 Because an import tariff on a given good is equivalent to a domestic production subsidy and a 
domestic consumption tax of the same amount, banning import tariffs is equivalent to placing a 
restriction on domestic policies, which explains the second best nature of these policy scenarios. 
 
15 Thus, for example, we do not allow a tax on domestic corn production.  
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be shown that (17A) reduces to16
 
 
(17B) 
( )
λσ σ
α
  
′ ′= − − + + − − −    ′ ′∆   
.c of e e f g g
o
D S
dW p p dx p p dx
Q p
 
 
Here ( ) ( ) ( )( )o o o o op S p S pβ∆ ≡ +  is the supply of unblended gasoline, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }c c c c c c cQ p S p D p D p≡ − −  is the residual supply of corn for ethanol. When both fuel 
taxes and ethanol subsidies can be used, the second best policies are 
 
(19)   
( )
σ
λ σ
α
′= +
′∆
′= − + +
′ ′∆
 1
sb o
sb o c
S
t
S D
b
Q
   
 
 
where the superscript “sb” denotes second best. The tax sbt can be thought of as the tax levied 
on gasoline, which incorporates two positive components because increased gasoline use 
worsens the U.S. terms of trade for oil and increases pollution costs. The difference between the 
tax and subsidy optimal levels, sb sb cb t D Qα λσ′ ′− = − , represents the effective overall subsidy 
(or tax) on ethanol; the positive component reflects the fact that increased ethanol use benefits 
the United States by increasing world corn prices, while the negative component reflects the 
pollution costs associated with ethanol use.   
When the ethanol subsidy is the only choice variable, the government cannot 
independently control gasoline and ethanol consumption. For this case it can be shown that the 
optimal ethanol subsidy, as a function of the exogenous fuel tax, 0t , is17
 
   
                                                 
16 The paper by Lapan and Moschini (2009) contains the details, but the logic underlying (17B) is 
direct. If the government induces increased ethanol use, this increases the price of corn: 
specifically, 1c edp dx Qα ′= . Similarly, increased gasoline use will drive up the price of oil, 
harming the country by making imports more expensive. 
 
17 This formula differs from the corresponding one in Lapan and Moschini (2009) because here 
we explicitly allow for the presence of petroleum byproducts, a feature that is important for the 
quantitative results of interest in this study. In the special case where 2 0β =  (i.e., no 
byproducts), of course, the two conditions are identical. 
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(20) ( ) 01sub c oD Sb t
Q
β
λσ ρ σ ρ
α ψ
 
′ ′= − + + + −  ′ ′ 
    
where 
  
( ) ( )
( )βρ
β β β β
′∆
= ∈
′ ′ ′ ′ ′∆ − + ∆
2
2
0,1 .
f f bD D D
 
 
Note that ( )( )01sub sb sbb b t tρ= + − −  . Hence, when the fuel tax is not a choice variable and 
0 sbt t< , then the subsidy will generally be lower than the second best subsidy and this subsidy 
will be increasing in the exogenous tax rate.  
When only the mandate is the choice variable, it can be shown that the first-order 
condition for an optimal choice of the mandate reduces to18
 
 
(21) 0
man
gc o
f e f g
e e
dxD SdW p p p p
dx Q dx
λσ σ
α
   
′ ′  = − − + + − − − =     ′ ′∆         
where the superscript “man” denotes the mandate scenario, and 
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 ′ ′∆ −
 
   
 
where ( )( ) 0,1e e gs x x x≡ + ∈  denotes the share of ethanol in total fuel, and ( )δ ≡ − − > 0e gp p b . 
In the simulations that follow, we consider each of the cases discussed above.  
 
5. Calibration of the Model   
The baseline model is calibrated to fit 2009 data using linear supply and demand curves. In order 
to calibrate the model, we need to specify the values of the exogenous parameters and the value 
                                                 
18 Again, the procedure for deriving this result is similar to that in Lapan and Moschini (2009), 
but the specific result differs because of the presence, in our model, of petroleum byproducts. 
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of the policy variables in this baseline period. In addition, we also need to specify the domestic 
and world import demand functions for corn ( )c cD p and ( )wc cD p , the domestic supply of corn 
( )c cS p , the domestic and world export supply functions for oil ( )o oS p  and ( )wo oS p , the 
demand for fuel ( )f fD p  and the demand for petroleum byproducts ( )h hD p . If these functions 
come from a two-parameter family of functions, as for the linear functional forms that we will be 
using, each demand or supply function can be “calibrated” using an estimate of the elasticity (of 
supply or demand) for that function and the value of the relevant variables in the baseline period. 
Table 1A gives the assumed baseline values, and sources, for the primitive parameters 
(e.g., elasticities) used in the calibration of the model, and Table 1B gives the value of some other 
calculated parameters, and their method of calculation, which are provided to ease the 
interpretation of the model. Tables 2A and 2B give the primary sources (or methods of 
calculation) and the 2009 value used for each baseline variable, including the policy variables. 
Some parameters are drawn from a comprehensive survey of the literature, while others are 
calculated from their definitions in terms of more primitive terms. In general, data for corn 
utilization and price are gathered from the Feed Grain Database of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) at  http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/, and data for oil, gasoline 
and oil refinery byproducts are obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) website at http://www.eia.doe.gov/. Ethanol quantity data are from the Renewable Fuels 
Association (RFA) website and ethanol prices are provided by the Nebraska Energy Office 
(NEO) website at http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html. More specific information on 
sources of data used is provided in the tables that follow. 
 
5.1. Prices in the Baseline 
Because ethanol has a lower energy content than gasoline, its quantity, price, fuel tax and subsidy 
level used in the simulation are all converted to be expressed per GEEG. Currently, fuel 
consumption (blended gasoline with ethanol) is subject to the federal tax of $0.184/gallon plus 
state-level taxes, which are, on average, equal to $0.203/gallon. Hence, for gasoline, 0 $0.39t = . 
However, because one gallon of ethanol equals only .69 GEEG, the fuel tax on ethanol is 0 γt  , 
that is, $0.565/GEEG. Ethanol production has a tax credit of 0 =b $0.45/gallon when blended 
with gasoline, which is equivalent to a net subsidy to ethanol of 0 =b  $0.475/GEEG. The U.S. 
ethanol price of $1.79/gallon is the 2009 average rack price F.O.B. Omaha, Nebraska, and this 
17 
 
corresponds to a price of $2.59/GEEG.19
= − + = .0 0 2 50f ep p b t $
 Prices of fuel and (unblended) gasoline are calculated 
from arbitrage conditions, which are assumed to hold in the status quo, that is, 
/GEEG, and = − = .0 2 11g ep p b $ /GEEG.
20
hp
 The crude oil price of 
$61.00/barrel is the refiner’s composite acquisition cost of crude oil, the weighted average of 
acquisition costs of domestic and imported oil. The corn price of $3.74/bushel uses the averaged 
farm price. The USDA price of the byproduct in ethanol production, DDGS, is $114.40/t 
(metric ton), which reflects the wholesale price in Lawrenceburg, IN. We used EIA data to 
calculate a weighted average retail price, excluding taxes, for petroleum byproducts in the oil 
refining process; this price index is denoted , and its 2009 value is $1.76/GEEG.21
gw
 The prices 
of the “other” inputs used in gasoline and ethanol production,  and ew , are derived from the 
zero profit condition, β β β= + − = .2 1 10g g h ow p p p $ /GEEG and 1.11e e cw p p $α= − =
/GEEG, respectively. The estimated productivity parameters α , β  and 2β  are discussed next.  
 
5.2. Productivity Parameters 
One bushel of corn produces approximately 2.80 gallons of ethanol (Eidman 2007); thus 
2 80a = . . The production of ethanol generates bioproducts that are useful as animal feed (and 
thus can replace corn in that use). The nature of such bioproducts depends on whether ethanol 
is produced in a dry milling plant or in a wet milling plant. Because dry milling plants are much 
more common, we construct the model as if all ethanol is produced in dry milling plants. 22
1 0.303δ =
 
According to industry sources (RFA), such a process generates as a byproduct about 17 lbs of 
DDGS per bushel of corn; given that there are 56 pounds in a bushel, then . The 
                                                 
19 See http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html for the primary data. 
 
20 This calculation method is necessary for the internal consistency of our model. A question, 
perhaps, is how close this calculated value is to 2009 observed data. From EIA data, the average 
retail price of all grades and all formulations of gasoline in 2009 was $2.406/gallon, which is 
fairly close to the calculated fuel price. Also, from the same source, the average wholesale (rack) 
price of gasoline in 2009 was $1.75/gallon, which is not too close to our computed gasoline 
price.  
 
21 Because prices for all the byproducts of the refining process were not available, the price index 
we constructed only uses the prices of aviation gasoline, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, 
distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil. Together, these products account for 70%, by weight, of 
all petroleum byproducts in the oil refining process.  
 
22According to the RFA, more than 80% of corn used in ethanol production is processed via dry 
milling plants, with the remaining 20% processed via wet milling plants.  
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DDGS price relative to the corn price is captured by the parameters 2 0.776δ =  , calculated as 
described in Table 1A from the data discussed in the foregoing. Given the assumption of perfect 
substitution between corn and DDGS in feed use, then each processed bushel of corn generates, 
as a byproduct , the equivalent of 1 2 0 24δ δ = .  bushels of corn.
23
2.53α =
 Hence, the ethanol production 
coefficient, accounting for byproduct value, is GEEG/bushel.  
 
5.3. Quantities in the Baseline  
For the baseline scenario, we use domestic production including stock changes and other 
adjustments to measure domestic supply, net exports of corn to measure foreign demand and net 
imports of oil to measure foreign oil supply. In the status quo (for 2009), there are 13.15 billion 
bushels of corn and 1.93 billion barrels of domestic oil produced in the U.S. The quantities of 
foreign corn demanded (U.S. exports) and oil supplied (U.S. imports) were 1.86 billion bushels 
and 3.29 billion barrels, respectively. Corn utilization consists of three main uses: domestic 
food/feed use (exclusive of ethanol use), foreign demand (exports) and ethanol use. The U.S. 
ethanol production of 10.76 billion gallons (RFA data) corresponds to 7.43 billion GEEG. 
Given the assumed fixed-proportion technology of ethanol production, the net amount of corn 
used in ethanol production is calculated to be 2 94c eQ x α= / = .  billion bushels. The corn 
food/feed use is then obtained from market balance, where 8 35c c c cD S D Q= − − = .  billion 
bushels. EIA reports data for the finished motor gasoline product, including blended ethanol, of 
134.4 billion gallons, which measures total fuel consumption in volumetric units. Subtracting 
ethanol production (in volumetric units) from the figure for finished motor gasoline gives 
unblended gasoline’s contribution to total fuel consumption, 123.6gx =  billion GEEG units. 
Final fuel consumption, measured in GEEG units is the sum of gasoline and ethanol 
consumption in the same units, 131 0f g ex x x= + = .  billion GEEG units. The assumed fixed-
proportions technology in oil refining gives the calculated yield of gallons of gasoline per barrel 
of crude oil as 23.6g ox xβ = / =  GEEG/barrel.
24 β Given , the yield of petroleum byproducts 
                                                 
23 EPA now assumes that 1 pound of distillers grains will replace 1.196 pounds of total corn and 
soybean meal for various beef cattle and dairy cows in 2015. The displacement ratio remains at 
1:1 for swine and poultry (EPA 2010). 
 
24 Alternatively, one could recover the β  parameter from refinery yields data reported by EIA, 
e.g., β = (42 gallon/barrel) × (1 - Annual Average Process Gains) × (Finished Motor Gasoline 
Yield). Note that this formula accounts for the fact that EIA measures gains as negative 
numbers. This procedure would yield 20.6β = GEEG/barrel. The discrepancy of this value with 
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(in gallons) from a barrel of crude oil is calculated to be 2 21.1 .β =
25
 
 
5.4. Carbon Emissions 
The carbon emission rate of gasoline, measured as carbon dioxide (CO2), is 11.29 kg/GEEG 
(Wang 2007). The estimated net carbon dioxide emissions rate of ethanol has a considerable 
range, which depends on feedstock sources and the accounting for indirect land use changes. We 
apply the rate of 8.42 kg/GEEG of CO2 from the life cycle perspective suggested by Farrel et al. 
(2006), which is close to the emission rate of corn ethanol without feedstock credits reported in 
Searchinger et al. (2008). There is, of course, considerable uncertainty (and controversy) about 
ethanol’s actual carbon dioxide emissions. For example, Searchinger et al. (2008) estimate the 
following specific CO2 rates: 5.934 kg/GEEG for corn ethanol with feedstock credits, and 
19.164 kg/GEEG for corn ethanol without feedstock credits but accounting for land-use 
changes.26
λ
 These values, in turn, imply that the relative pollution efficiency of ethanol to gasoline 
(i.e., the parameter ) is around 0.75 in the benchmark case, with a range of 0.52 to 1.70 .27
To capture the influence of such uncertainty on the optimal values of the policy instruments, 
some sensitivity analysis on the impact of ethanol’s emissions rate will be carried out.  
 
 
5.5. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Cost   
There are extensive estimates regarding the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions. Tol (2009) 
surveys 232 published estimates of the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide. The mean of 
these estimates is a marginal cost of carbon emissions of $105/tC (metric ton carbon), which is 
equivalent to $28.60/tCO2, with a standard deviation equivalent to $243/tC ($66/tCO2), where 
social costs are measured in 1995 dollars. The widely cited “Stern Review” (Stern et al. 2006) has 
a higher estimate of approximately $80/tCO2, due to a lower discount rate applied to future 
                                                                                                                                                        
the one we use, as explained in the text, is likely due to the additives in blended gasoline. 
 
25 As explained in Table 1, there are 42 gallons per barrel of crude oil, and because of a yield gain 
in the refining product, there are approximately 44.7 gallons of refined product per barrel of oil. 
Subtracting the calculated value of 23.6 gallons of gasoline per barrel of crude oil provides the 
calculated value of 2β .  
 
26 Note that, for ease of comparison, we have converted their measures of carbon dioxide 
emissions rates from grams of CO2 per megajoule of energy to kilograms per GEEG. The 
feedstock credits refer to the carbon benefit of devoting land to biofuels (Searchinger et al. 
2008). 
 
27 The value for λ  of 0.75 corresponds closely to the recent EPA released value of 0.79 (EPA 
2010). 
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economic damage from climate change. Using a more conventional discount rate, Hope and 
Newbery (2008) find that the carbon cost from the Stern report could be reduced to the range of 
$20-$25/tCO2.  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) calculates their proposed 
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard by relying on Tol’s (2008) survey, which 
includes 125 estimates of the social carbon cost published in peer-reviewed journals through the 
year 2006 (NHTSA 2009). Tol (2008) reports a $71/tC mean value, and a $98/tC standard 
deviation of these estimates of the social carbon cost (expressed in 1995 dollars). Adjusted to 
reflect increases of emissions at now-higher atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, and 
expressed in 2007 dollars, Tol’s (2008) mean value corresponds to $33/tCO2, with a standard 
deviation of about $47/tCO2. NHTSA (2009) also employs a range of estimates for the value of 
reducing GHG emissions, which consists of a domestic value ($2/tCO2) at the lower end, a 
global value ($33/tCO2) equal to the mean value in Tol (2008), and a global value ($80/tCO2) 
one standard deviation above the aforementioned mean value.  
The EPA (2008) derives estimates of the social carbon cost using the subset of estimates 
in Tol’s (2008) survey. They report an average value of $40/tCO2 for studies using a 3% discount 
rate, and $68/tCO2 for studies using a 2% discount rate. These values are also updated to reflect 
increases in the marginal damage costs of emissions at growing atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 and expressed in 2006 dollars.  
The pollution externality cost used in our paper is meant to account for local and global 
warming costs. We use a value of $33/tCO2, which, as discussed, is consistent with NHTSA 
(2009). For our sensitivity analysis we explore the implications of different values for this cost, in 
the range of $2/tCO2 – $100/tCO2. The lower end of this range is of some interest because it 
corresponds to the NHTSA estimate of the impact of CO2 pollution on the domestic economy 
only. Other externality costs associated with congestion, accidents and non-carbon pollution are 
not explicitly taken into account.28
( )σ ⋅
 Given the assumed linear cost function of the emissions 
externality , the marginal effect ( )σ ′ ⋅  represents the normalized constant marginal emissions 
damage from gasoline. Given our assumption of $33/tCO2 for the cost of carbon dioxide 
pollution, ( )σ ′ ⋅ = 37 cents/GEEG. 
 
                                                 
28 Parry and Small (2005) take the lower and upper limit of pollution damages to be $0.7/tC and 
$100/tC respectively, and the central value to be $25/tC. They also account for external 
congestion costs of 3.5¢/mile, and an external accident cost of 3¢/mile. 
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5.6. Elasticities   
The elasticity estimates are obtained from the literature to reflect the best available econometric 
evidence. As most of the studies suggest that the short-run corn supply elasticity is within the 
range of [0.2, 0.4], and the long-run supply elasticity is 0.5, we pick a value of 0 23cε = .  from the 
USDA (2007).29 0.2cη = − The elasticity of domestic food/feed demand of  is from de Gorter 
and Just (2009b). The estimates for the elasticity of foreign corn import demand ( )cη  range from 
an inelastic value of -0.30 (short-run value) used by Gardiner and Dixit (1986), to a considerably 
more elastic value of -2.41, reported by the country commodity linked system performed by the 
Economics Research Service at the USDA. They get implied partial elasticities of foreign 
behavior with respect to a sustained exogenous shock to the world price of corn only, the 
implied elasticity of net imports in the third year is -2.41. We use the value of -1.74, obtained 
from the 2004 FAPRI Missouri documentation, and also carry out sensitivity analysis within the 
range of [-3.0, -1.0]. Estimates for the elasticities of domestic oil supply ( )oε  of 0.2 and foreign 
export oil supply ( )oε  of 2.63 are drawn from de Gorter and Just (2009b).30
fη
 A range of [1.0, 5.0] 
for elasticity of foreign export oil supply is considered for the purpose of sensitivity analysis. The 
elasticity of fuel demand  is assigned a benchmark value of -0.5, with the range [-0.9, -0.2], as 
suggested by Toman, Griffin and Lempert (2008), which is consistent with Parry and Small 
(2005) as well (they use an elasticity of gasoline demand of -0.55, with the range [-0.9, -0.3]). As 
for elasticities of gasoline and ethanol supply, the construction of our model does not need these 
as primitive parameters, although the implied elasticities of the derived ethanol supply and 
gasoline supply are easily derived for the purpose of comparison with other models.31
 
  
                                                 
29 Gardner (2007) uses a short-run elasticity of 0.23 from USDA, and a long-run elasticity of 0.5; 
de Gorter and Just (2009b) use 0.2 as the elasticity of corn supply. 
 
30 They define the foreign oil (export) supply as the horizontal difference between the OPEC 
supply and the excess demand of other oil importers excluding the United States, then derive this 
elasticity under the assumption that OPEC supply elasticity is 0.71 and the excess demand is 
-0.86, both of which are in the range of Leiby (2007). 
 
31 Quantities are given by production technology, and prices are found from long-run equilibrium 
conditions, as explained in the text. Given these quantities and prices, the implied elasticities (in 
the baseline case) of the derived ethanol supply and gasoline supply can be calculated as per the 
formulae reported in Table 1 to yield 4 73eε = .  and ε = .1 42g , respectively. 
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6. Results   
Given the assumed parameters discussed in the foregoing section, the remaining parameters of 
the model are calibrated (i.e., the coefficients of the postulated linear supply and demand curves 
are computed) to replicate price and quantity data of the baseline (or status quo) scenario for the 
calendar year 2009. We then consider a number of policy environments; only in the first-best 
situation are border policies (import and export tariffs) allowed. These scenarios are as follows: 
(i) Laissez-faire, with no border or domestic taxes or subsidies. 
(ii) Current fuel tax but no ethanol policy. 
(iii) The first best: border policies and domestic policies are used. 
(iv) The second best: the fuel tax and ethanol subsidy are chosen optimally. 
(v) The ethanol subsidy is chosen optimally; the fuel tax is set at its current level. 
(vi) An ethanol mandate is chosen optimally; the fuel tax is set at its current level. 
For each scenario, we report in Table 3A the values of the policy instruments and the 
equilibrium value of the simulated variables. In Table 3B, for the same sets of scenarios, we 
report the welfare impacts (as changes from the fictitious laissez faire equilibrium), broken down 
into their components so as to illustrate the distributional effect, as well as the impact of each 
scenario on the total carbon emission.32 The overall net welfare gains are calculated in the usual 
manner, by summing the (changes in) producer surpluses, consumer surpluses, government tax 
revenue and the pollution damages.33
 
 Perhaps the most striking thing about our results is that all 
scenarios improve upon the laissez faire equilibrium solution. In particular, the status quo 
equilibrium with “ad hoc” levels of the ethanol subsidy and the fuel tax captures over one-half of 
the maximum gain that can be achieved with first-best policies. 
6.1. Status Quo and Status Quo Ante Ethanol   
The status quo values for prices and quantities reflect the actual (average) values of those variables 
for 2009. Compared to the simulated laissez faire equilibrium, the fuel tax of $0.39/GEEG and 
the gross ethanol subsidy of $0.45/gallon lead to higher (retail) fuel prices, higher ethanol prices, 
a very modest 3% decline in (world and domestic) oil prices but a significant 18% increase in 
corn prices. Consequently, the combined policy causes domestic fuel consumption to fall—but 
just barely—as a 6.7 billion gallon decline in gasoline consumption is offset by a 6.4 billion gallon 
                                                 
32The producer surpluses for ethanol producers and oil refiners are zero because of the assumed 
constant-returns-to-scale technology and competitive behavior in these sectors 
 
33 Because ethanol production for 2009 exceeds the mandate level, in calibrating the model we 
assume that the mandate does not bind, and that it is the fuel tax and ethanol subsidy policies 
that affect equilibrium values. 
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increase in ethanol consumption (a 4.4 billion increase in GEEG units). This (small) drop in fuel 
consumption—and the substitution of some ethanol for gasoline—leads to a 3% (or a 49.9 
million tCO2) decrease in carbon dioxide emissions; at the baseline cost of $33/tCO2, this is 
equivalent to a $1.6 billion decrease in pollution costs. As Table 3B shows, the principal 
beneficiaries of this status quo policy are the government (higher tax revenue) and corn producers, 
while oil producers are hurt by the fuel tax and consumers are hurt by higher prices (but they 
benefit, however modestly, because of the reduced externality incidence). As previously noted, 
relative to the laissez faire there is an $8 billion increase in net welfare, which amounts to 53% of 
the maximum gain achievable by optimum policies. U.S. dependence on foreign oil also declines, 
as oil imports (billion barrels) fall by about 8%.   
 The column “no ethanol policy” in Table 3B looks at the scenario in which the current 
fuel tax of $0.39/GEEG continues to apply, but there is no subsidy or other policy supporting 
ethanol production. When compared to the status quo scenario, this case provides a useful 
characterization of the marginal impact of current U.S. ethanol policies. Specifically, without 
such policies the ethanol industry would be almost non-existent, with only 0.58 billion gallons of 
production (around 5% of the status quo value). The lack of explicit government support is not 
the only effect working against ethanol production in this scenario: the fuel tax, being levied per 
volume of fuel, implicitly taxes ethanol at a higher rate (because of the latter’s lower efficiency 
level in GEEG terms). The fuel price is also higher with no ethanol policy than in the status quo, 
which illustrates an aspect of current policies discussed by de Gorter and Just (2009b): the 
ethanol subsidy has a consumption subsidy effect for final consumers. As for welfare effects, the 
introduction of the current ethanol support policy is beneficial (the welfare measure of the status 
quo exceeds that of the no ethanol policy scenario by $6.3 billion). But note that the mechanism 
by which this happens is not by reducing pollution, which actually is higher under the status quo 
than under the no ethanol policy scenario (by 20 million tCO2). Instead, ethanol policies are 
mostly useful because of their terms-of-trade effects. Comparison of these two scenarios in 
Table 3B also illustrates that the big winners from the ethanol policy are corn producers and fuel 
consumers.  
 
6.2. The First Best Policies 
In the baseline scenario, the marginal emissions damage is $33/tCO2 and thus the first best 
policy entails a tax on carbon dioxide emissions of $33/tCO2, in addition to oil import and corn 
export tariffs. This tax on carbon dioxide emissions is equivalent, in our model, to a gasoline tax 
of $.37/GEEG, which is remarkably close to the status quo (average) fuel tax of $0.39. Since in 
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the baseline model ethanol is assumed to pollute less than gasoline, and since the $0.37 tax is 
assumed levied on gallons of fuel, then a gross subsidy to ethanol of $0.18/gallon (or *b =
$0.094/GEEG) is required to support the first best solution. Thus, the first best policies entail a 
27.8¢/GEEG tax on ethanol, a 37¢/GEEG tax on gasoline, a $19.2/barrel import tariff on oil, 
and a $1.10/bushel export tariff on corn. These policies would increase welfare by $15.0 billion 
compared to the lassez faire scenario, and $7.0 billion compared to the status quo. Compared to the 
laissez faire scenario, the combined effect of these policies is to increase U.S. oil prices by over 
21%, while world oil prices fall by slightly over 9%. Despite the corn export tariff, U.S. corn 
prices increase by 16.4% (world corn prices rise by over 51%); because of the conversion of corn 
into ethanol, the negative impact on U.S. corn prices of the corn export tariff is overwhelmed by 
the positive impact of higher domestic oil prices. Overall fuel consumption falls significantly, and 
ethanol replaces some gasoline, so carbon dioxide emissions fall by slightly over 10%. U.S. 
dependence on foreign oil falls sharply, as imports fall by nearly 24%, oil consumption falls and 
domestic oil production rises. From a welfare perspective, domestic oil producers and corn 
producers both gain and the government gains significant tax revenue, but consumers lose both 
because of higher oil (and fuel) prices and because of higher corn prices.   
Compared to current policies, the first best policy leads to a significant reduction in oil 
imports, fuel consumption and pollution, and a significant increase in ethanol production. Corn 
prices fall as the negative impact of the lower ethanol subsidy and the corn export tariff more 
than offset the positive impact on corn prices because of the oil import tariff. Thus, while the 
implementation of first best policies brings a welfare gain of $7.0 billion compared to the status 
quo, there is a significant redistribution of income away from consumers and corn producers to 
oil producers and the government. Moreover, more than half of the welfare gain is accounted for 
by the decline in pollution costs. 
 
6.3. Second Best Policies: Fuel Taxes and Ethanol Subsidies   
The second best fuel tax and ethanol subsidy are presented in the fourth column of Table 3B. 
Interestingly, we see that these policies perform almost as well as the first best policies in terms 
of the welfare gain, and actually result in a (very slightly) larger reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions. In addition, oil imports are only 3% larger than under first best policies. The first best 
oil tariff of $19.2/barrel (at 23.6 gallons per barrel) is similar to a gasoline tax of $0.81/gallon; 
combined with the $0.37/gallon tax for pollution damages, this means the first best policies are 
similar to an overall fuel tax of $1.18, which is remarkably close to the second best tax of $1.17, 
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as given in Table 3A.34 We also see from the table that, relative to the first best, the ethanol 
subsidy increases significantly. Note that the second best policy can be characterized as a tax on 
gasoline at the rate of $1.16/gallon and a small net tax on ethanol (the second-best subsidy of 
$1.16/gallon for ethanol essentially offsets the fuel tax). This results in an increase in ethanol 
production to 15.2 billion gallons, slightly above the 2015 mandate level of 15 billion gallons. 
The combined policies also lead to a nearly 17% increase in domestic corn prices. Thus, the fuel 
tax increases largely offset the elimination of the oil import tariff, and the ethanol subsidy 
increase partially offsets the impact on the world corn price of the elimination of the corn export 
tariff.35
Even though the second best policy captures almost 90% of the gains achievable by the 
first best policy mix (relative to laissez faire), the distributional effects differ. Compared to the first 
best policy mix, consumers lose more, largely because of higher domestic corn prices; domestic 
oil producers suffer significant losses as the domestic price of oil falls, but corn producers gain 
and government tax revenue increases. Overall, the policy largely redistributes income from oil 
producers to the government. Perhaps the principal surprise is how well this second best policy 
mix performs compared to the first best policy mix.  
 Compared to the laissez faire, these policies reduce world oil prices by 8% and increase 
world corn prices by over 36%; relative to the first best, world oil prices increase by a very 
modest $0.60/barrel and world corn prices fall by a more substantial $0.47/bushel.  
It should also be noted that the crucial difference between this second best scenario and 
the first best scenario discussed earlier is that here, border policies (oil import and corn export 
tariffs) are precluded. Having restricted the policy space to taxing fuel while supporting ethanol 
production, which policy instrument is used in the ethanol market does not matter. More 
precisely, the second best policy mix could be alternatively characterized as comprising an 
ethanol mandate equal to the second best ethanol production (15.22 billion gallons) along with 
the appropriate fuel tax (which can be shown to equal $1.03/gallon). 
  
6.4. Optimal (Constrained) Ethanol Policy 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3A report the results of two scenarios in which ethanol policy 
instruments are the only levers, with the fuel tax fixed at its current rate of $0.39/gallon. 
Specifically, in the scenario of column 5 an ethanol subsidy is the only discretionary policy 
                                                 
34 The reason the gasoline tax it is not equivalent to an oil import tariff, despite the assumed 
Leontief technology for converting oil to gasoline, is because the gasoline tax is also levied on 
domestic oil production. 
 
35 Of course, the fuel tax affects corn prices and the ethanol subsidy has a modest affect on oil 
prices. 
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instrument, and in the scenario of column 6, an ethanol mandate is the only instrument. For 
both cases it is seen that, while there are significant welfare gains relative to the laissez faire 
equilibrium, the gains compared to the status quo are not large; thus, in terms of our second best 
policy instruments, the fuel tax has a potentially larger impact on welfare than does ethanol 
policy.  
As shown in the sixth column of Table 3A, the optimal ethanol subsidy, when the fuel 
tax is fixed at $0.39/GEEG, is $0.68/gallon, fairly close to the status quo subsidy level and, as 
predicted by the theory, well below the second best subsidy level that applies when fuel taxes are 
also chosen optimally. However, for the case of the $0.39/gallon fuel tax, the “net” subsidy to 
ethanol is actually $0.42/GEEG, as opposed to a net tax of only $0.02/GEEG in the second 
best scenario. Compared to the second best scenario, ethanol production increases by 4.5%, and 
exceeds the 2015 mandate level of 15 billion gallons. Compared to the second best, the lower 
fuel tax means that gasoline consumption also increases, so CO2 emissions are not only higher 
than in the second best, they are higher than in the status quo situation (Table 3B). Overall, then, 
given the fuel tax, the benefits of adjusting the subsidy away from its status quo value are minimal, 
and the environmental benefits are negative. 
As noted in Lapan and Moschini (2009), an ethanol mandate is equivalent to a revenue 
neutral ethanol subsidy and fuel tax. Since column 6 combines this mandate with the status quo 
fuel tax, and since this combined effective fuel tax is lower than the second best combination of 
fuel tax and ethanol subsidy, the optimal mandate yields higher welfare than the optimal subsidy 
policy (column 5). Of course, by construction, the welfare level that is attained here is lower than 
that associated with the optimal second best policy (column 4). Compared to the optimal subsidy 
policy, since raising the ethanol mandate simultaneously raises the effective fuel tax, gasoline 
consumption is lower under the mandate than under the subsidy whereas ethanol production 
(and hence the price of ethanol) exceeds that under any other policy.36 This ethanol consumption 
level exceeds the RFS2 mandate requirement of 15 billion gallons per year of conventional 
biofuel (corn ethanol) by 2015. The mandate also leads to higher domestic corn prices than 
under any of the other policies, and world corn prices are higher only in the first best case when 
a corn export tariff is used. World oil prices are lower than under the status quo or the optimal 
ethanol subsidy, but higher than under the first or second best policies.37
                                                 
36 In the case in which the mandate is the only choice variable, raising it has the additional effect 
of reducing gasoline consumption and imports; under either first or second best policies, 
gasoline consumption can be controlled through its own policy instrument. 
 Carbon dioxide 
 
37 World corn and oil prices are important because they reflect the terms of trade for the United 
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emissions are lower than under the optimal ethanol subsidy but higher than under the first or 
second best policies. These emissions decrease relative to the status quo even though total fuel 
consumption increases by 1.0 GEEG as the replacement of some gasoline by ethanol is 
sufficient to overcome the increase in overall fuel consumption. Welfare, by definition, is higher 
than under the status quo, and also higher than under the optimal subsidy, but considerably lower 
than under first or second best policies. In other words, the mandate is superior to an ethanol 
subsidy but not nearly as effective as an (optimally) chosen fuel tax. 
 
6.5. Summary of Baseline Results 
By definition, the inability to use the first best policies, including import and export tariffs, must 
result in lower welfare. Nevertheless, when we are free to choose optimally the ethanol subsidy 
and fuel tax, this second best policy combination comes surprisingly close to matching the first 
best policy in terms of welfare gains and carbon emission reductions. Naturally, the additional 
restriction to only one free policy instrument—the ethanol subsidy or the ethanol mandate—
leads to further welfare declines. In either of these cases, since fuel taxes (or oil import tariffs) 
are not choice variables, it is desirable to increase ethanol consumption (and price), with the 
larger increase coming under the mandate because of the fact that raising the mandate increases 
the effective tax on fuel. Because of this effective tax, the ethanol mandate yields higher welfare 
and higher ethanol utilization than does the ethanol subsidy, and, as noted, the optimal mandate 
leads to fulfillment of the RFS2 mandate on conventional biofuel by 2015, as do the second best 
policies. Still, the clear lesson is that fuel taxes are a more powerful instrument for reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions and increasing welfare than are ethanol policies. 
 
6.6. Sensitivity Analysis  
In order to investigate the robustness of our conclusions, we varied key parameters one at a time, 
recalibrated the model (when necessary) to the status quo 2009 baseline, and then explored the 
welfare implications of alternative policies. The alternative values for each of the parameters that 
we considered are summarized in Table 4 and refer to the following parameters: (i) cost of 
carbon dioxide emission; (ii) relative pollution efficiency of ethanol; (iii) elasticity fuel demand 
and of petroleum byproduct demand; (iv) elasticity of foreign corn import demand; (v) elasticity 
of foreign oil export supply. 
Needless to say, the optimized value of the relevant policy instruments changed with the 
change in these basic parameters. Whereas the Appendix, and Tables A1-A6 therein, provide 
                                                                                                                                                        
States and thus are one component of the welfare impact of each policy. 
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more details, there are several results that are common to all sensitivity analysis experiments: 
▪ For all cases considered, the status quo policies dominated laissez faire and in all cases, 
except when foreign oil export supply is very inelastic, delivered at least 40% of the 
maximal benefits achievable with first best policies. 
▪ The basic result that the fuel tax/ethanol subsidy regime is a close substitute for first best 
policy holds for all cases. 
▪ The optimal mandate policy dominated the optimal subsidy policy in all cases and it 
resulted in the highest use of ethanol in all cases considered. Nevertheless, in most cases 
it did not significantly outperform the status quo in welfare terms, the one exception being 
when foreign oil export supply was very inelastic. 
▪ In all cases in which ethanol emitted less pollution than gasoline (per GEEG), the 
optimal mandate resulted in lower pollution than the optimal ethanol subsidy (even when 
carbon dioxide was priced at $2/tCO2). The mandate also resulted in lower pollution 
than laissez faire except when the foreign oil export supply elasticity was very low—in this 
case the potential welfare gains associated with higher ethanol use, through the terms-of-
trade effect on oil, were so large that CO2 emissions increased relative to laissez faire. 
▪ In all cases, though, the carbon emissions reductions achieved through either the first 
best or the second best policy of fuel taxes and ethanol subsidies were very close to each 
other and far exceeded those achieved under any other considered policy. Not 
surprisingly, oil imports were always lowest under the first best, when oil tariffs were 
used, but the second best was a very close second in reducing U.S. dependence on 
foreign oil.  
▪ The welfare gains achievable with the second best policy of fuel taxes and ethanol 
subsidies was greater than 81% of the maximum gains achievable in all cases (the average 
of this fraction of the maximum welfare gain, over all experiments reported in the 
Appendix, is 89%).  
▪ The case in which optimal policy delivered small gains—and hence did not improve 
much on other policies, such as the status quo or the optimal mandate—was when the 
world oil export supply elasticity was large (5.0). This illustrates the dominating role 
played by the oil market on the potential gains from government policy.  
▪ Varying the parameters of the model does not change one of our basic results: the case 
for ethanol is not largely about pollution, but rather, it is about the policy’s impact on the 
U.S. gains from trade (through its impact on the terms of trade). 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper constructs a tractable computational model, which applies and extends the analytical 
model of Lapan and Moschini (2009), to analyze the market and welfare impacts of U.S. energy 
policies. Specifically, using this framework, we formally solve the optimal values for policy 
instruments under alternative policy scenarios. We then calibrate the model to fit the baseline 
period of 2009, and use simulation to compare equilibrium quantities, prices and net welfare 
under the alternative policy settings. Not surprisingly, the simulations support the policy rankings 
in Lapan and Moschini (2009), and in particular the conclusion that an ethanol mandate 
dominates an ethanol subsidy policy. 
There are several interesting findings. First, the second best instruments of a fuel tax and 
an ethanol subsidy come close to replicating the outcomes under the first best policy 
combination of oil import tariffs, corn export tariffs and a carbon tax. For our baseline model, 
the second best fuel tax of $1.17/GEEG and ethanol subsidy of $1.16/gallon would increase 
ethanol consumption to 10.5 billion GEEG units (15.2 billion gallons), a 41% increase compared 
to the current (status quo) situation, it would decrease gasoline consumption by almost 10% and it 
would reduce emissions by 7.4%, as compared to the status quo.  
In addition, the ethanol mandate, when used optimally in conjunction with the existing 
fuel tax would achieve the highest ethanol consumption, of approximately 18 billion gallons 
(12.4 billion GEEG), which exceeds the RFS2 mandate on conventional biofuels (15 billion 
gallons per year by 2015). However, since the effective tax on fuel is lower than under either the 
first or second best policy, it would achieve a smaller reduction in carbon emissions and a 
smaller welfare gain than would either of these policies. Finally, because of the magnitude of U.S. 
oil imports, the greatest economic gain arising from any policy intervention considered is due to 
the terms of trade effects through the world oil market. Because we have not included any other 
putative gain from reducing oil imports (e.g., national security effects arising from a reduced 
dependence on imports), we probably still significantly underestimate the potential gains 
associated with policies that reduce oil imports.  
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Table 1A –  Primitive Parameters Used to Calibrate the Model 
 
Parameter symbol value Source/explanation 
Domestic supply elasticity of oil oε  0.20 de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Foreign supply elasticity of oil oε  2.63 de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Domestic supply elasticity of corn cε  0.23 USDA (2007) 
Foreign demand elasticity of corn cη  -1.74 FAPRI (2004) 
Domestic demand elasticity of corn cη  -0.20 de Gorter and Just (2009b) 
Demand elasticity of fuel fη  -0.50 
Toman, Griffin and Lempert 
(2008) 
Demand elasticity of petroleum 
byproducts hη  -0.50 Assumed equal to 𝜂𝜂𝑓𝑓  
Ethanol produced by one bushel of corn 
(gallons/bushel) a  2.8  Eidman (2007) 
DDGS production coefficient  1δ  0.303 1δ 17 56=  
DDGS relative price to corn 2δ  0.776 ( ) ( )2 114.4 56 3.74 2205δ = × ×  
Gasoline production coefficient 
(gallon/barrel) 
β  23.6  g ox xβ =  
Ethanol heat content 
(BTUs/gallon) eγ  76000  NREL (2008) 
Gasoline heat content 
(BTUs/gallon) g
γ  110000  NREL (2008) 
CO2 emissions rate of gasoline 
(kg/gallon) g
CE  11.29  Wang (2007) 
CO2 emissions rate of ethanol 
(kg/GEEG) eCE  8.42  Farrel et al. (2006) 
Marginal emissions damage 
($/tCO2) 
( )σ ′ ⋅  33 NHTSA (2009) 
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Table 1B – Calculated Parameters Used in the Model 
 
Parameter symbol value Source/explanation 
Derived supply elasticity of 
ethanol eε  4.73 
( )se c c c c c c e c cS D D p Q pε ε η η α= − −
 
Derived supply elasticity of 
gasoline g
ε  1.42 ( )g o o o o g o oS S p x pε ε ε β= +  
Portion value of DDGS returning 
to corn market 1 2δ δ  0.24 calculated 
Ethanol produced by one bushel 
of corn accounting for DDGS 
value (GEEG/bushel) 
α  2.53  
1 21
aγ
α
δ δ
=
−
 
Petroleum byproduct production 
coefficient (GEEG/barrel) 1 2β  21.1  
2 42 1.065β β= × −  
Ethanol energy equivalent 
coefficient (GEEG/gallon) 
γ  0.69 e gγ γ γ=  
Relative pollution efficiency λ  0.75 e gCE CEλ =  
Normalized marginal emissions 
damage of gasoline ($/gallon) ( )σ
′ ⋅  0.372 ( ) ( 0) 1,0 0gCEσ σ′ ′⋅ = ⋅  
 
1. A 42-U.S. gallon barrel of crude oil provided around 6.5% average gains from processing 
crude oil in 2009 (see Refinery Yield Rate Table (EIA) accessible at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_pct_dc_nus_pct_m.htm). 
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Table 2A – Value of Variables at the Calibrated Point (raw data for year 2009) 
 
Variable Symbol Value Source/explanation 
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0t  0.39  
sum of federal tax 18.4¢/gal and weighted 
average of state tax 20.6¢/gal (EIA).1 
Ethanol subsidy 
($/gallon) 
0b  0.45  RFS2 
Oil price ($/barrel) op  61.0 
composite acquisition cost of crude oil 
(EIA).2 
Corn price 
($/bushel) cp  3.74 
weighted average farm price of corn 
(Feed Grains Database, USDA).3 
Ethanol price 
($/gallon) 
v
ep  1.79 
ethanol average rack price in Omaha, 
Nebraska 
DDGS price ($/ton) dp  114.4 
wholesale price in Lawrenceburg, IN 
(Feed Grains Database, USDA).4 
Domestic oil supply 
(billion barrels) oS  1.93  
production plus adjustments and stock 
changes (EIA).5 
Foreign oil supply 
(billion barrels) oS  3.29  net import (EIA). 
Ethanol supply  
(billion gallons) 
v
ex  10.76  domestic production (RFA). 
Fuel demand  
(billion gallons) 
v
fD  134.4  
finished motor gasoline including ethanol  
(EIA). 
Domestic corn supply 
(billion bushels) cS  13.15  
domestic production (Feed Grains 
Database, USDA).6 
Foreign corn import 
demand (billion bushels) cD  1.86  
net export (Feed Grains Database, 
USDA). 
 
1. These tax values are taken from the EIA table “Federal and State Motor Fuels Tax” at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_marketing_monthly/curr
ent/pdf/enote.pdf. 
2. Oil price comes from table “Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil” (EIA) 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_rac2_dcu_nus_m.htm. 
3. Corn price comes from table “Corn and Sorghum: Average Prices Received by Farmers” (Feed Grains 
Data, USDA). http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=09 
4. DDGS price comes from table “Byproduct Feeds: Average Wholesale Price, Bulk, Specified Markets” 
(Feed Grains Data, USDA). http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=16 
5. Oil domestic/foreign supply and fuel/ethanol supply on volumetric basis come from table “Supply and 
Disposition” (EIA). http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbbl_m_cur.htm 
6. Corn supply and foreign demand come from table “Corn: Supply and Disappearance” (Feed Grains 
Data, USDA). http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/Table.asp?t=04 
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Table 2B – Variables at the Calibrated Point (calculated values) 
 
Variable Symbol Value Source/explanation 
Net ethanol subsidy ($/GEEG) ob  
0.477 γ γ γ= − − (1 )o o ob b t  
Ethanol price  ($/GEEG) ep  2.59 γ=e /
v
ep p  
Fuel price  ($/GEEG) fp  2.50 − += f e
o op p b t .1 
Gasoline price  ($/GEEG) gp  2.11 = − e
o
gp p b  
Price of inputs other than corn in 
ethanol production  ($/GEEG) eω  1.11 /e e cp pω α= −  
Price of inputs other than oil in 
gasoline production  ($/GEEG) g
ω  1.10 2g g h op p pω β β β= + −  
Price of petroleum byproducts  
($/GEEG) hp  1.76 
weighted average retail price 
excluding taxes (EIA).2 
Quantity of petroleum byproducts 
(billion GEEG)  hx  110.3  2h ox xβ=  
Oil supply (billion barrels) ox  5.22  oo ox S S= + . 
Corn used in ethanol production 
accounting for byproduct value 
(billion bushel) 
cQ  2.94  /c eQ x α=  
Domestic corn demand as food/feed 
uses (billion bushels) cD  8.35  cc c cD S D Q= − −  
DDGS supply (billion bushels) dx  0.89  1d cx Qδ=  
Ethanol supply (billion GEEGs) ex  7.43  ee
vx xγ=  
Gasoline supply(billion GEEGs) gx  123.6  v vg f ex D x= −  
Fuel demand (billion GEEGs) fD  131.0  f g eD x x= +  
 
1. Ethanol subsidy, quantity and price are converted into GEEG units in simulation. 
 
2. Price index includes resale prices to end users excluding taxes for aviation gasoline, kerosene-type jet 
fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil, which come from table “Refiner Petroleum Product 
Prices by Sales Type” (EIA), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_m.htm. 
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Table 3A – Market Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios 
 
 Laissez Faire 
No 
Ethanol 
Policy 
Status  
Quo 
First  
Best 
Optimal 
Tax & 
Subsidy 
Optimal 
Subsidy  
Optimal 
Mandate  
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.37 1.17 0.39 0.39 
Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon)1 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.18 1.16 0.68 0.00 
Oil Tariff ($/barrel) 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Corn Tariff ($/bushel) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fuel Price ($/GEEG) 2.36 2.64 2.50 2.85 2.84 2.44 2.47 
Gasoline Price ($/GEEG) 2.36 2.25 2.11 2.48 1.67 2.05 1.97 
Ethanol Price ($/gallon) 1.63 1.43 1.79 1.78 1.95 1.97 2.04 
U.S. Oil Price ($/barrel) 62.9 62.0 61.0 76.2 57.6 60.5 59.9 
U.S. Corn Price ($/bushel) 3.17 2.43 3.74 3.69 4.32 4.41 4.67 
Petroleum byproduct Price 
($/GEEG) 1.57 1.66 1.76 2.07 2.10 1.81 1.87 
Gasoline Quantity  
(billion GEEG) 130.3 127.2 123.6 112.5 111.7 121.8 119.7 
Ethanol Quantity  
(billion gallons) 6.32 0.58 10.76 13.84 15.22 15.92 17.94 
Corn Production  
(billion bushels) 12.69 12.09 13.15 13.11 13.62 13.69 13.90 
Corn Demand  
(billion bushels) 8.61 8.94 8.35 8.38 8.10 8.06 7.94 
Corn Export  
(billion bushels) 2.36 2.99 1.86 0.95 1.36 1.29 1.06 
Oil Domestic Supply 
(billion barrels) 1.95 1.94 1.93 2.03 1.91 1.93 1.93 
Oil Import (billion barrels) 3.56 3.43 3.29 2.72 2.81 3.22 3.13 
 
Notes: (1) Although we use GEEG units for ethanol price, subsidy and quantity in our simulation, as 
discussed in the text, for ease of interpretation the results reported here are converted into natural units. 
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Table 3B  –  Welfare Effects of Alternative Policies (Changes Relative to Laissez Faire)  
 
 
 Laissez Faire 
No 
Ethanol 
Policy 
Status 
Quo 
First 
Best 
Optimal 
Tax & 
Subsidy 
Optimal 
Subsidy 
Optimal 
Mandate 
Social Welfare ($ billion) -- 1.7 8.0 15.0 13.4 8.8 9.8 
Pollution effect  
($ billion) -49.8 2.3 1.6 5.2 5.2 1.3 1.7 
Tax Revenue  
($ billion) 0 49.8 47.6 97.9 131.3 42.9 53.7 
P.S. Oil Supply  
($ billion) -- -1.7 -3.7 26.4 -10.2 -4.7 -5.9 
P.S. Corn Supply  
($ billion) -- -9.2 7.4 6.7 15.1 16.3 19.9 
C.S. Corn Demand  
($ billion) -- 6.5 -4.9 -4.4 -9.6 -10.3 -12.4 
C.S. Fuel Demand  
($ billion) -- -35.7 -18.5 -62.0 -61.3 -9.6 -13.4 
C.S. Petroleum 
byproduct 
  
-- -10.3 -21.6 -54.8 -57.1 -27.2 -33.8 
CO2 Emission (million tCO2) 1,508 -69.0 -49.9 -157.6 -158.6 -40.3 -52.8 
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Table 4 – Parameters and Values Used in the Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Parameter Symbol Baseline Range 
Cost of CO2 emission ($/tCO2 ) ( )σ ′ ⋅  33 [2 , 100]  
Ethanol CO2 emission efficiency λ  0.75 [0.52 , 1.70] 
Elasticity of fuel demand fη  -0.5 [-0.9 , -0.2] 
Elasticity of foreign corn import demand cη  -1.74 [-3.0 , -1.0] 
Elasticity of foreign oil export supply oε  2.63 [1.0 , 5.0] 
Elasticity of petroleum byproduct demand hη  -0.5 [-0.9 , -0.2] 
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Appendix – Sensitivity Analysis 
Tables A1 to A6 provide a few more details on the sensitivity analysis carried out. In these 
tables we concentrate on the main four scenarios discussed in the text: the first best solution 
with border policies and the carbon tax; the second best solution without border policies but 
where the fuel tax and the ethanol subsidy are optimally chosen; the case when the only active 
policy instrument is an ethanol subsidy; and the case in which the active policy instrument is the 
ethanol mandate. For each case only one parameter at a time is changed from the set of baseline 
values, and for each of these tables we report the results of the baseline parameters (middle 
column) along with the lower and upper ends of the parameter ranges postulated (as reported in 
Table 4). 
The elasticity of the foreign oil export supply 0ε  plays a predictable, but crucial, role. 
Naturally, the optimal oil import tariff varies inversely with this elasticity. The second best policy 
with the optimal fuel tax and ethanol subsidy also varies inversely with this parameter’s values. 
But note that even a fairly elastic supply of foreign oil ( 0 5ε = ) provides scope for the fuel tax 
and ethanol subsidy to exceed $0.8/gallon, and the second best solution still achieves over 80% 
of the gain achievable with the first best policy. Perhaps the most noticeable effect is that, as the 
export supply elasticity increases, the relative performance of the ethanol-only policy (compared 
to the first and second best) improves, because the higher foreign supply elasticity means that the 
gains obtained from taxing foreign oil become less important.  
  Altering the elasticity of foreign corn import demand ηc  over the range considered has 
predictable results. Hardly surprising, the first best corn export tariff varies inversely with this 
elasticity, but the impact on the optimal oil tariff is minimal (and the first best carbon tax is 
unaffected). The most notable result, perhaps, is that the second best instruments do not 
perform as well, in a relative sense, when the foreign corn demand is very inelastic. This is not a 
surprise because, whereas the fuel tax does a good job of approximating an import tariff (given 
the low domestic oil supply elasticity), the ethanol subsidy—or mandate—is not a very good 
substitute for the corn export tariff. Thus, when foreign corn demand is inelastic, the second 
best policies, and ethanol policies alone, are not as effective. Still, ethanol policies are useful, and 
in the case when fuel taxes are not endogenous, the optimal mandate can exceed 18 billion 
bushels.  
Varying the elasticity of domestic demand for fuel and petroleum byproducts, η f  and 
,hη  does not have very dramatic results. As one would expect, the oil import tariff, or, in the 
case of the second best, the fuel tax, is (marginally) higher when fuel demand is inelastic. Also, 
given the fuel tax, the optimal ethanol subsidy, or ethanol mandate, is higher when domestic fuel 
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demand is inelastic. The basic result that the fuel tax/ethanol subsidy regime is a close substitute 
for first best policy still holds. 
When the cost of CO2 is reduced to $2/tCO2, the first best gasoline tax is only 2¢ per gallon, 
and the relative attractiveness of ethanol because of its lower pollution emissions is negligible. 
Nevertheless, the first best policies—which do not include a measurable ethanol subsidy—not 
only deliver significant welfare gains compared to the status quo, but they also result in sharp 
increases in ethanol production and—despite a $0.99/bushel tax on corn exports—an increase in 
the U.S. corn price. This outcome is driven by the $20.20/barrel oil import tariff, which drives 
up domestic fuel prices and increases the competitiveness of ethanol. In the second best case, 
the high fuel tax proxies for the oil import tariff and the ethanol subsidy (the net ethanol subsidy 
is $0.21/GEEG) partly proxies for a corn export tariff. Because of these two policies, the second 
best price of corn is considerably higher than in the first best situation (though the world price of 
corn is lower than in the first best case); and the world price of oil in the second best case is only 
slightly higher than in the first best case, indicating that the fuel tax is a much better proxy for an 
oil import tariff than is the ethanol subsidy for a corn export tariff. Finally, given an exogenous 
fuel tax of $0.39/GEEG, the optimal subsidy is larger than the status quo level, and thus a binding 
ethanol mandate can improve upon both the status quo and an ethanol subsidy. Note that, even 
without a carbon-pollution rationale for ethanol mandates, the impact of the mandate on world 
oil and corn prices is such that ethanol production under the mandate exceeds the current 
mandated level for 2015 by almost 3 billion gallons. 
Raising the cost of CO2 to $100/tCO2 has predictable effects on first and second best 
policies and outcomes. The first best fuel tax increases to $1.13/gallon—reflecting the costs of 
emissions—and due to the assumption that ethanol releases less pollution, a gross subsidy of 
$0.55/gallon (equivalent to *b = $.29/GEEG) is part of the first best solution. The higher fuel 
tax, by itself, would reduce U.S. imports and this, in turn, means that tariffs will be lower than 
under the case where the pollution tax was minimal. Note that in this case the second best 
policy, while still a good proxy for first best policies, far outperforms the case in which only 
ethanol policy is discretionary. Indeed, given the existing fuel tax, the optimal subsidy—and the 
welfare outcome—is only slightly above the status quo level. In this case, the ethanol mandate 
leads to a considerable improvement over the ethanol subsidy and to considerably more ethanol 
output than the subsidy. The reason for the dominance of the mandate is because the tax on fuel 
is very low compared to its second best level ($0.39 versus $1.84), and hence the implicit fuel tax 
embodied in the mandate is more important than the implicit subsidy. One less transparent 
result, perhaps, is that ethanol production—under either the optimal subsidy or the optimal 
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mandate—is lower when pollution costs are high. That is, while more ethanol on the market 
crowds out some gasoline, total fuel consumption expands as ethanol production increases, and 
the efficiency gain of using ethanol is not sufficient to offset the pollution costs of the expanded 
fuel consumption. Thus, the argument for an ethanol mandate is not really because of ethanol’s 
relative pollution efficiency, but rather because of both the implicit tax on fuel and also the 
terms-of-trade effect. Clearly, then, in the logic of this model, combining an ethanol subsidy with 
the mandate is very poor policy.  
Variations in the relative efficiency of ethanol in terms of pollution emissions—from 
.52λ =  to 1.7λ = —have predictable results in terms of the ethanol subsidy/tax but don’t 
otherwise overturn other patterns with the exception that, in the case when ethanol pollutes 
more than gasoline, optimal ethanol mandates lead to more pollution than optimal ethanol 
subsidies (not a surprising result). Nevertheless, mandates still deliver higher welfare, and the 
largest use of ethanol still occurs under mandates. Despite the significant subsidies to ethanol, 
status quo policies—even when ethanol is more polluting—still deliver higher welfare than laissez 
faire, and the status quo subsidy is remarkably close to the optimal subsidy, given the fuel tax. The 
story remains that the case for ethanol is not largely about pollution, but rather it is about the 
policy’s impact on the U.S. gains from trade (through the impact on the terms of trade). 
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Table A1 – Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Foreign Oil Supply   
 
 1.0ε =o  2.63ε =o  5.0ε =o  
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 43.07 19.20 10.93 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        0.83 1.10 1.26 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 17.22 13.84 11.95 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -215.9 -157.6 -123.6 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 43.31 15.03 8.15 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 2.13 1.17 0.83 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 2.06 1.16 0.84 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 18.72 15.22 13.42 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -227.1 -158.6 -122.3 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 37.41 13.43 7.20 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.92 0.68 0.58 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 20.96 15.92 13.67 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -10.9 -40.3 -50.9 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 16.79 8.77 5.69 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) -- -- -- 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 26.96 17.94 14.60 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -26.6 -52.8 -61.0 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 21.25 9.84 6.11 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
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Table A2 – Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Foreign Corn Demand   
 
 3.0η = −c  1.74η = −c  1.0η = −c  
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 19.21 19.20 19.20 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        0.65 1.10 1.90 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 13.79 13.84 13.87 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -155.9 -157.6 -158.7 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 14.82 15.03 15.63 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 1.17 1.17 1.17 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 1.11 1.16 1.21 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 14.83 15.22 15.65 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -157.7 -158.6 -158.8 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 13.48 13.43 13.47 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.63 0.68 0.74 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 15.63 15.92 16.29 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -39.0 -40.3 -40.8 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 8.80 8.77 8.83 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) -- -- -- 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 17.64 17.94 18.38 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -49.8 -52.8 -55.3 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 9.77 9.84 10.02 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
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Table A3 – Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Fuel Demand 
 
 0.9fη = −  0.5fη = −  0.2fη = −  
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 18.69 19.20 19.93 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        1.22 1.10 0.94 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 12.41 13.84 15.85 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -201.2 -157.6 -98.0 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 16.96 15.03 12.46 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 1.15 1.17 1.20 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 1.15 1.16 1.16 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 13.95 15.22 17.05 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -201.0 -158.6 -99.9 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 15.32 13.43 10.90 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.61 0.68 0.78 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 14.61 15.92 17.59 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -52.3 -40.3 -30.6 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 9.41 8.77 8.20 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) - - - 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 17.28 17.94 18.67 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -63.6 -52.8 -40.6 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 10.64 9.84 8.90 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
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Table A4 – Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Petroleum byproduct Demand 
 
 0.9hη = −  0.5hη = −  0.2hη = −  
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 18.67 19.20 20.22 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        1.04 1.10 1.23 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 14.66 13.84 12.26 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -187.2 -157.6 -103.4 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 17.68 15.03 10.39 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 1.15 1.17 1.22 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 1.12 1.16 1.22 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.02 15.22 13.69 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -189.4 -158.6 -101.7 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 16.20 13.43 8.55 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.71 0.68 0.60 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.97 15.92 14.00 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -55.0 -40.3 -18.2 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 10.94 8.77 5.22 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) - - - 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 19.37 17.94 15.26 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -74.1 -52.8 -22.2 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 12.34 9.84 5.78 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
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Table A5 – Sensitivity Analysis: Cost of CO2 pollution ($/tCO2) 
 
 ( ) 2σ ′ =   ( ) 33σ ′ =   ( ) 100σ ′ =   
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.02 0.37 1.13 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.01 0.18 0.55 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 20.20 19.20 17.06 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        0.99 1.10 1.34 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 15.19 13.84 10.91 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -108.8 -157.6 -263.1 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 10.90 15.03 29.12 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.87 1.17 1.84 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 1.01 1.16 1.47 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.47 15.22 12.54 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -110.3 -158.6 -263.0 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 9.27 13.43 27.56 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.72 0.68 0.59 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.89 15.92 13.83 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -38.4 -40.3 -44.2 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 7.55 8.77 11.60 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) -- -- -- 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 17.942 17.941 17.939 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2) -52.8 -52.8 -52.8 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion) 8.21 9.84 13.38 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
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Table A6 – Sensitivity Analysis: Ethanol Pollution Efficiency Parameter   
 
 0.52λ =  0.75λ =  1.70λ =  
First best    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.37 0.37 0.37 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.24 0.18 -0.07 
     Oil tariff ($/barrel) 19.12 19.20 19.58 
     Corn tariff ($/bushel)        1.02 1.10 1.47 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 14.91 13.84 9.32 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -170.2 -157.6 -146.0 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 15.50 15.03 13.74 
Tax & Subsidy    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 1.17 1.17 1.19 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 1.20 1.16 0.98 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.20 15.22 11.11 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -173.6 -158.6 -132.7 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 13.98 13.43 11.75 
Subsidy-only     
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) 0.72 0.68 0.50 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 16.89 15.92 11.82 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -57.1 -40.3 -7.0 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 9.35 8.77 6.91 
Mandate    
     Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.39 0.39 0.39 
     Ethanol Subsidy ($/gallon) -- -- -- 
     Ethanol Quantity (billion gallons) 18.97 17.94 13.49 
     CO2 Emission Changes (million tCO2)1 -75.1 -52.8 -0.5 
     Social Welfare Changes ($ billion)2 10.55 9.84 7.53 
Notes: CO2 Emission changes and Welfare Changes are relative to Laissez Faire. 
